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Why Do People Support Capital Punishment? The
Death Penalty as Community Ritual

DONALD L. BESCHLE"
INTRODUCTION

Public attitudes toward capital punishment have been on something of
a roller coaster ride in recent decades. After reaching historic lows in the
1960s, support for the death penalty skyrocketed to the point where, in
1988, Governor Michael Dukakis critically wounded his presidential campaign when he failed to voice support for capital punishment during a televised debate. Since then, no national candidate has made the same mistake.
But in recent years, as Ronald Tabak demonstrates, at least partly due
to the ability to demonstrate the actual innocence of some on death row,
support for the death penalty, though still commanding a majority nationwide, is trending down.' Death penalty opponents, while not abandoning
hope of completely abolishing capital punishment, have focused on the
short term goals of the moratorium movement. How successful is this
movement likely to be, either in its short-term goals, or as a step toward
complete renunciation of the death penalty? Any answer to that question
will require that we explore the reasons that death penalty supporters have
for their position. Does capital punishment meet some genuine social need
in the United States, and if it does, how, if at all, can that need be satisfied
in the absence of the death penalty? An exploration of these questions may
lead us in some surprising directions.
I. WHY DO PEOPLE SUPPORT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT?
SOME STANDARD ANSWERS

Ronald Tabak reminds us that the abolition or retention of capital punProfessor, The John Marshall School of Law. B.A. Fordham University. 1973; J.D. New York
University School of Law, 1976; LLM. Temple University School of Law, 1982.
1. See generally Ronald J.Tabak, Finality Without Fairness: JFhy IVeAre AioWng Towhds Moratoria on Executions, and the Potential Abolition of Capital Punishment, 33 CoN. L REV. 733 (2001).
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ishment is primarily a political issue; he does not spend time dwelling on
the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.2 This
is surely the pragmatic thing to do; the likelihood that the Supreme Court
3
will ban the practice in the foreseeable future is essentially nonexistent.
To be sure, there will be courtroom battles, but these are likely to be successful only in refining the procedural requirements necessary to satisfy the
Due Process Clause.4 And ultimately, the most significant impact of these
cases will likely prove to be their impact on public opinion rather than the
black letter law that they produce.
Political issues will be resolved by the political branches of government, acting with at least one eye focused on public opinion. Polls indicate
that public support for the death penalty is at its lowest point in decades,5
but capital punishment retains the support of about two thirds of Americans.6 How should an abolitionist deal with this persistent majority favoring retention?
One way to deal with opponents, particularly on emotionally charged
issues, is to see them as either ignorant, acting in bad faith, or operating
from base motives. But this will rarely succeed in winning converts; those
acting in bad faith or out of bad motives are probably immune to counterargument, and treating opponents as entirely ignorant leads to condescension, which is not the best way to change minds. An alternative approach
requires us to take our opponents much more seriously, especially where
their views command widespread support. For the most part, people are
not drawn to beliefs or policies that they themselves regard as false, useless, or socially destructive. A sophisticated theologian will realize that
popular acceptance of even the most distasteful heresy indicates that in
some way it addresses a real, felt need, and that the way to counter it is not
merely through denunciation, but an attempt to understand and respond to
2. See generally id.
3. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). In Furman, the Court invalidated then-existing
death penalty statutes, but three of the five justices in the majority did not object to capital punishment
per se, merely to the arbitrary way in which those statutes determined who would be executed. Id. at
241, 308-1I. Four years later, in Gregg v. Georgia, the Court approved a statute that provided "guidance" and "direction" to the sentencing jury. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 192-98 (1976) (Stewart,
Powell, and Stevens, JJ., plurality opinion). Since then, the Court has shown no indication that it will
find the death penalty to be a per se violation of the Constitution. See. e.g., Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S.
37 (1989); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
4. See Joseph L. Hoffman, Is Innocence Sufficient? An Essay on the U.S. Supreme Court's ContinuingProblems with FederalHabeas Corpus and the Death Penalty, 68 IND. L.J. 817, 818-19 (1993).
Hoffman concludes that the Supreme Court is "process oriented" rather than "substantive," focusing on
the procedures by which the death penalty is imposed, instead of the question of whether particular
sentences are deserved. Id.
5.

DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., SUMMARIES OF RECENT POLLS FINDINGS, at http://www.

deathpenaltyinfo.org/Polls.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2001). This Website, maintained by the Death
Penalty Information Center, contains an extensive collection of polling data on the death penalty.
6. The Death Penalty Information Center cites Gallup and Harris polls finding that, while support
for the death penalty has eroded in recent years, it still stands at about sixty-five percent. Id.
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that need in a more satisfactory way.'
In the same way, the legal reformer faced with persistent majority opposition should assume that that opposition reflects some genuine perceived need, and that that need will have to be taken into account in the
framing of any proposed reform. Why do we have capital punishment in
the United States? What are its goals, and how well does it achieve them?
These are, of course, not merely philosophical inquiries. Putting aside the
Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment any government practice that takes away life or liberty must at least satisfy the basic
due process requirement of bearing a rational relationship to a legitimate
government interest. What interest does capital punishment address?
The death penalty surely has no rational relationship to the goal of rehabilitation. Indeed, it might well be seen as the ultimate statement by the
legal system that, at least in some cases, rehabilitation is impossible." In
contrast, capital punishment is clearly effective in achieving the goal of
incapacitation, or specific deterrence, that is, making sure that the individual actor will never repeat his crime. But it seems unlikely that incapacitation is at the core of public support for the death penalty. If we put aside
the rare case of a prisoner already under a life sentence either committing
another murder in prison, or escaping and killing again, a life sentence
without chance of parole will be just as effective in incapacitating a killer.
Some opinion polls indicate that when the alternative of such a life sentence is presented, a significant number of people will abandon their support of the death penalty." Thus, incapacitation is highly relevant to some.
But the alternative of life imprisonment does not change the opinion of
most supporters of capital punishment. It is unlikely that incapacitation is
truly the dominant goal of death penalty supporters.
For decades, most policy arguments over capital punishment turned on
7. For example, the contemporary theologian Hans Kung, in developing his case against atheism
in his book, goes to great length to affirm that atheism must be taken seriously, that one must respect
"the positive aspects of atheism" and the "negative aspects of belief in God," in order to conduct a
mature dialogue. HANS KUNG, DOES GOD EXIST? AN ANSWER FOR TODAY 338 (1980). While ultimately leaving no doubt about his own stance, Kung maintains that believers can learn much of value
from the positions of their opponents, who developed their opposition, in many cases, in response to

genuine abuses and inadequacies in the conduct and teachings of religious leeders. AL
8. U.S. CONST., amend. VIII; seesupra note 3.

9. In recent years, the prominence of rehabilitation as a goal of the criminal justice system has
faded even in regard to juveniles, the one group of offenders for whom the rehabilitative ideal survived

for most of the twentieth century. But in recent years, states have moved sharply in the direction of
subjecting more and more juvenile offenders to the full force of the more punitive, less rehabilitative,
adult system. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Youth Crime-and What Not To Do About It. 31 VAL. U. L REV.

435,437 (1997).
10. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., SENTENCING FOR LIFE: AMiERICA D EMBRACE ALTERNATIVESTO

THE DEATH PENALTY (1993), at http/www.deathpcnaltyinfo.org/dpic.r07.html (last visited Jan. 28,
2001). When explicitly made aware of alternatives including life imprisonment without parole, respondents divided almost evenly on whether they would still prefer the death penalty. Id.
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its utility, or lack thereof, in deterrence. It is striking, therefore, to note
that Ronald Tabak barely mentions the question of deterrence in his article.
This omission, however, is not a serious flaw. On the contrary, it is strong
evidence of the degree to which deterrence is no longer truly at the center
of the capital punishment debate.

To be sure, death penalty advocates continue to assert their belief that
capital punishment will deter, but this argument faces enormous obstacles.
While not unanimous,"' the majority of social science research on the issue
concludes that the death penalty has no effect on the homicide rate.' 2 In
the face of this research, death penalty proponents appeal to the instinctive

notion that the prospect of execution simply must be so frightening as to
deter, 3 but this, of course, hypothesizes a rational, well-thought out deci-

sion by a fully competent potential killer, not overwhelmed by emotion or
acting on the spur of the moment.
But there is a more fundamental problem regarding deterrence as the
core value sought by the use of capital punishment. To deter, we need not

execute only those who are actually guilty; as long as the intended audience of rational potential killers perceives the person who is executed as

guilty, they will be deterred. Of course, open and frequent execution of the
innocent might destroy the deterrent effect by breaking the link in the
minds of the audience between the act of murder and the punishment, but a
pure utilitarian would have little problem with a system that frequently
executed the innocent, as long as it strikes terror into the hearts of the general public. 4 But few would approve of the careless execution of the innocent, regardless of its deterrent effect, and almost no one would approve of
the intentional execution of such a person.
We are all, to some extent, children of the Enlightenment, and so, we
feel comfortable arguing about capital punishment based upon its deterrent
11. For arguments supporting the deterrent effect of capital punishment, see Isaac Ehrlich, The
Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question ofLife and Death, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 397, 397
(1975), and Isaac Ehrlich, Deterrence: Evidence and Inference, 85 YALE L.i. 209,225 (1975).
12. E.g., William Bailey, Deterrence, Brutalization and the Death Penalty: Another Examination of
Oklahoma's Return to Capital Punishment, 36 CRIMINOLOGY 711, 711 (1998); Jon Sorenson et al.,
Capital Punishment and Deterrence: Examining the Effect of Executions on Murder in Texas, 45
CRIME & DELINQ. 481, 481 (1999); see also Emie Thomson, Effects ofan Execution on Homicides in
California, 3 HOMICIDE STUDIES 129, 145 (1999). For a discussion of earlier findings reaching the
same conclusion, see FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
AMERICAN AGENDA 167-86 (1986).
13. Capital punishment supporter Ernest van den Haag gave voice to this conviction: "Even though
statistical demonstrations are not conclusive,... I believe that capital punishment is likely to deter
more than other punishments because people fear death more than anything else.... Whatever people
fear most is likely to deter most." Ernest van den Haag, The Death Penalty Once More, 18 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 957, 965-66 (1985).
14. "Whether someone is guilty of a crime or deserves to die for it is not of concern to the pure
utilitarian. But no one in her right mind is a pure utilitarian." Margaret Jane Radin, Proportionality,
Subjectivity, and Tragedy, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1165, 1170 (1985).
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effect. Deterrence sounds logical, scientific, measurable and entirely rational.' 5 But even if we accept, in the face of the weight of the evidence,
the existence of a substantial deterrent effect, the fact that deterrence might
be achieved without a vigorous commitment to executing only the guilty
compels the conclusion that deterrence is, at best, a secondary foundation
for the death penalty.
With rehabilitation, incapacitation and deterrence seen as implausible
foundations for capital punishment, we find ourselves left with only retribution as a traditional justification. And this will strike most of us as
strange. Less than three decades ago, Justice Thurgood Marshall could
state that in modem America "no one has ever seriously advanced retribution as a legitimate goal," but that the argument in favor of the death penalty was "always mounted on deterrent" grounds. 6 While this was somewhat of an overstatement, 7 Marshall was no doubt correct that retribution
was generally seen as a rather primitive instinct, unworthy of a rational,
modem legal system.
But in the years since Justice Marshall's statement, there has been a
noticeable trend "to return to the earlier notions of subjective culpability as
the basis of criminal liability.' 'I8 This "return to retributivist-based notions
of moral culpability" takes the position "that the purpose of the criminal
law is to reflect the moral standards of our society and to punish those who,
1 Guilt, desert,
with culpability and awareness, violate those moral norms.""'
and blameworthiness have returned to center stage, to at least share the
spotlight with utilitarian concerns, ifnot to displace them, in criminal law.
To understand, and perhaps even to empathize with, this trend, we will
have to first briefly explore contemporary understandings of what retribution is, and perhaps more importantly, what it is not. Retribution is not
merely unrestrained vengeance, but instead depends heavily on concepts of
proportionality. First of all, there must be proportionality between the
criminal act and the punishment imposed. This is a double-edged principle; it demands that punishment be neither too lenient nor too severe. The
biblical command of an "eye for an eye," ' usually invoked to justify sever15. See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L REV. 413, 413 (1999)
(arguing that Americans use deterrence arguments to mask their real commitment to other values which
are considered illegitimate in a legal system committed to rational liberal discourse).
16. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,363 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).

17. For a rare example of a defense of retribution during the years immediately preceding Furman,
see HJ. McCloskey, A Non-UtilitarianApproach to Punishment, 8 INQUIRY 239 (1965), reprintedin
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT

119 (Gertrude Ezorsk ed., 1972).

18. RIcHARD G. SINGER & MARTIN R. GARDNER, preface to CRIMES AND PUNISHMENr: CASES,
MATERIALS, AND READINGS IN CRIMINAL LAW, at v (2d ed. 1996).

19. Id. Singer and Gardner endorse this position in their coursebook. See ILd.
20. 22 Exodus 23-25 (New American Bible) (stating that "ifinjury ensues, you shall give life for
life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, bum for bum, wound for wound, stripe for

stripe").
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ity, is also a demand for restraint. An eye for an eye precludes the taking
of two eyes, or a life, for an eye.21
While the legal system clearly respects the general idea that there must
be proportionality between the act and the punishment, for the most part it
does not demand that the punishment literally recapitulate the crime. We
do not sentence rapists to be raped; we do not sentence those guilty of assault to be beaten. For the most part, the substitution of some combination
of jail time, fines and public humiliation, provided that the mix is sufficiently severe, satisfies our demands for justice. Where the crime is murder, however, public opinion shifts. To many, only losing one's life can be
a proportional punishment for the taking of life.22
But this "hydraulic" theory of punishment for murder runs into an immediate and significant obstacle. Even in the most aggressively pro-death
penalty states, capital punishment is imposed only upon some, but not all,
murderers. This is, of course, partly due to the Supreme Court's holding
that a broad mandatory death penalty would be unconstitutional," but there
is little reason to believe that even most supporters of capital punishment
would impose it on all killers.
This leads to the second aspect of proportionality. There must be a
relationship between the blameworthiness, i.e., the level of responsibility,
of the criminal and the punishment imposed. The legal system must look
beyond the mere act itself. This is almost instinctively obvious, and it is at
the heart of the Supreme Court's demand in Gregg v. Georgia,24 that a constitutionally applied death penalty must allow the jury to weigh both aggravating and mitigating factors.' But the demand that the legal system
assess the degree of an individual's blameworthiness raises a number of
serious problems as well.
A system that weighs individual aggravating and mitigating factors is
likely to be quite indeterminate, and worse, may permit illegitimate factors
to provide whatever level of determinacy the process actually has. Thus,
21.

See MARTIN HENBERG, RETRIBuTION: EVIL FOR EVIL IN ETHICS, LAW, AND LITERATURE 18

(1990) ("Retribution is a measured return of evil according to some notion of what an agent (or group)
is perceived to deserve. Revenge, on the other hand, is an unmeasured return or evil that may or may
not connect to desert.").
22. The classic statement of this position is from Immanuel Kant:
[W]hoever has committed Murder, must die. There is, in this case, no juridical substitute or
surrogate, that can be given or taken for the satisfaction of Justice. There is no Likeness or
proportion between Life, however painful, and Death; and therefore there is no Equality be-

tween the crime of Murder and the retaliation of it but what is judicially accomplished by
the execution of the Criminal.
IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN EXPOSITION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF

198 (photo. reprint, Augustus M. Kelley Publishers 1974)
(W. Hastie trans., 1887).
23. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,301-03 (1976).
24. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
25. Id. at 192-95.
JURISPRUDENCE AS THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT
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even where juries are not consciously acting from base motives, race or the
competence of defense counsel may play a prominent role in the sentencing decision. Where this occurs in a significant number of cases, it undermines the philosophical pillars of desert that support the entire structure of
a defensible retributivism. Andrew Oldenquist defends the notion of retribution, but insists on conditions that will distinguish it from mere vengeance.26 Prominent among these conditions are the requirements that the
punishment must be predictable and the product of deliberation by a neutral decision maker, rather than one of passion made by those too close to
the victim.27 How closely does the post-Gregg death penalty process in the

United States satisfy those conditions?
Procedural shortcomings can threaten the legitimacy of retributionbased punishment, but at least in theory, those flaws can be fixed. But the
retributivist must confront an even more troubling objection. If retribution
is based as much on the blameworthiness of the criminal as on the amount
of harm done, how does the legal system respond to arguments based in
biology, psychology or sociology that challenge the notion that the criminal had full capacity to exercise free will in choosing to transgress? Even
the pre-Darwinian, pre-Freudian legal world of the early nineteenth century
recognized that small children" and the obviously insaneP could not be
said to deserve punishment for the harm they caused. By the mid-twentieth
century, the physical and social sciences had so shaken many people's belief in free will that it became more difficult to speak of criminals as deserving harsh treatment at all. Infants and the obviously deranged, it might
be said, were different than the rest of us only in degree, not in kind.
More than any other factor, it is likely that this assault on the idea of
free will led to the general abandonment of retributive theory noted by Justice Marshall, 0 and to the law's recourse to consequentialist alternatives.
Perhaps a criminal did not "deserve" harsh treatment, but society, unfortunately, had to impose it to protect itself. But in recent years, the concept of
individual responsibility for one's actions has returned to center stage.
26. Andrew Oldenquist, An Explanation of Retribution, 85 1. PHIL 464, 464 (1988). Oldenquist
maintains that "a moral community exacts retribution for its own good and not prinarily to inform.

correct, cure, use, or to send any kind of message to the criminal." Id. at 471.
27. Id. at 474.

28. At common law, children under the age of seven were held incapable of forming criminal
intent Children between seven and fourteen years of age were presumed incapable, but this presumption could be rebutted. Children over the age of fourteen were fully responsible for their acts. Margaret May, Innocence and Experience: The Evolution ofthe Concept ofJusmlle Delinquency In the MidNineteenth Century, reprinted in 3 CRIME AND JUSTICE IN AMERICAN HISTORY: DELINQUENCY AND
DISORDERLY BEHAVIOR 46, 47-48 (nric H. Monkkonen ed., 1991).
29. See Daniel M'Naughten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). This ca=e established the classic.,

rigorous test that a defendant had to meet to establish a defense of insanity. The defendant, under this
test, must establish that he either was not conscious of the nature of the act he was committing, or that
he was not aware that it was considered wrongful. Id. at 723.
30. Seesupra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
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This is evident not only in aspects of criminal law, such as the narrowing
of defenses based on mental incapacity 31 and a sharply more punitive approach to juvenile crime,32 but also on such political issues as welfare reform.

It is not clear how much of this return to notions of individual responsibility is based on a general sense ofjustice, and how much is based on the
desire for deterrence. At this point, the arguments underlying retribution
and those underlying deterrence intersect; the retributivist will only punish
a free choice, deterrence assumes that punishment has an effect on people
since they are capable of rational choice. And this should serve to remind
us that the theories justifying punishment are not unrelated, and surely not
mutually exclusive. But where does this leave us in understanding the reasons that lead people to support capital punishment?
Deterrence, as we have seen, cannot by itself justify capital punishment. Not only does the weight of the evidence contradict the assertion
that the death penalty deters, but a single-minded focus on deterrence
would justify executing innocent people who could be made to appear
guilty, or executing not only the murderer, but his family as well, to raise
the cost to future potential killers as they calculate whether to kill. In theory, retribution provides a more comfortable basis for responding to murder with capital punishment, but the severe problems inherent in any attempt to determine not only guilt, but also the degree of a killer's blameworthiness make reliance on retributive theory almost equally problematic.
A principled retributivist should be genuinely disturbed at the Supreme
Court's approval of the execution of minors,3a adults with limited mental
abilities,' or those who are deprived of a fully deliberative appeals process
because of technical procedural points, 35 yet most death penalty supporters
3 1. During the decades following World War 11,broader definitions of the insanity defense and
other arguments in favor of mitigating individual responsibility were accepted. See Heatheote W.
Wales, The Rise, the Fall,and the Resurrection of the Medical Model, 63 GEO. L.J. 87, 88-89 (1974).

But recently, the trend has been to treat such excuses with much greater skepticism. Cf Sanford H.
Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CAL. L. REv. 257, 266-68 (1987). Many attribute the public backlash
against invocation of the insanity defense to the 1982 acquittal of John Hinckley, by reason of insanity,

in his trial for the attempted assassination of Ronald Reagan. SINGER & GARDNER, supra note 18, at
831-33.

32. This has taken hold despite the significant decline in the actual incidence ofjuvenile violence.
Eric R. Lotke, Youth Homicide: Keeping Perspective on How Many Children Kill, 31 VAL U. L. REV.

395,395 (1997).
33. In Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), the Supreme Court held that a defendant who

was fifteen years old at the time of his crime could not be executed, but indicated that the execution of
older minors was not impermissible. Id. at 818, 838.
34. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 338-39 (1989) ("[Il]t cannot be said on the record before us

today that all mentally retarded people, by definition, can never act with the level of culpability associated with the death penalty.").
35. A striking example is Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993), in which the Court rejected a
second habeas corpus petition by a death row inmate that was based on new evidence of actual innocence, rather than on any alleged violation of procedural rights. Id. at 397-400. Only three justices
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are undisturbed, if not enthusiastic, about these decisions.
Perhaps, then, it will be necessary to go beyond the standard, rational
jurisprudential arguments to fully understand support for the death penalty.
Oldenquist recognizes that there is a significant ritual element to the process of passing judgment and imposing penalties based upon retributive
norms. 6 It may be useful to examine whether these symbolic, ritual elements may prove to be not merely secondary aspects of a retributive regime, but at the very core of what we do when we choose to punish, especially when the punishment we choose to impose is death.
II. WHY Do PEOPLE SUPPORT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT?
AN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION

The standard rationales put forward to explain and justify capital punishment are, at best, only partially successful. Deterrence is an empirically
questionable justification, and in any event, cannot stand alone. Retribution may be theoretically sound, but it cannot justify a system that tolerates
either the execution of the innocent or of those not fully responsible for
their actions. But discovering this and declaring it to be so does not allow
an abolitionist to simply declare intellectual victory. We are still left with
the task of understanding the strong popular appeal of the death penalty.
Over the years, commentators have noted that capital punishment serves
both symbolic purposes and rational goals, 7 but few have considered the
possibility that these symbolic or ritual aspects were of central importance
in understanding the death penalty. Instead, the symbolism and ritual of
capital punishment would either be seen as merely an aspect of deterrence
(the execution sends a message to the community that causes them to fear
the executioner) or retribution (the ritual of the execution serves to express
community outrage)," or if not serving one of these goals, as self-evidently
insufficient to support the death penalty. But if we take the symbolic, nonrational elements of capital punishment seriously, we may find that they
would hold that a defendant who could show "that he probably is innocent" is entitled to habeas corpus
relief. Id. at 442 (Blackmun, J., with whom Stevens & Souter, JJ.joined, dissenting). Fourjustices
assumed "for the sake of argument" that a showing of innocence meeting an "extraordinarily high
standard of proof might require federal court intervention "if there were no state avenue open to process
such a claim." Id. at 417. And Justices Scalia and Thomas would simply hold that there is simply no
constitutional right to judicial consideration of newly discovered evidence. Id. at 427-28 (Scalia, J..
with whom Thomas, J.joined, concurring).
36. Oldenquist,supra note 26, at 471.
37. See. eg., Elizabeth D. Purdum & J. Anthony Paredes, Rituals of Death: Capital Punishment
and Human Sacrifice, in FACING THE DEATH PENALTY: ESSAYS ON A CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 141-53 (Michael L.Radelet ed., 1989); Mary Ellen Gale, Retribution.Punishmentand Death, 18
U.C. DAVIS L REV.973, 996-99 (1985); Hardy Jones & Nelson Potter, Deterrence. Retribution. Denunciation andthe DeathPenalty,49 UMKC L REV. 158. 167-69.
38. On the expressive function of punishment generally, see JOEL FEINB ERG. DOING AND DESERVING 96-105 (1970).
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not only provide surprising insight into the meaning and significance of the
death penalty, even in a modem, rationalist, society, but also provide lessons regarding the likelihood that various abolitionist strategies, such as
promoting DNA testing or declaring moratoria until assurances that bias is
eliminated from the system can be provided, will succeed.
Exploration of something as amorphous as the symbolic power of the
death penalty will require a framework for analysis, and a powerful framework can be found in the theories of Rene Girard. Drawing on literature,
anthropology, religion, and psychology, Girard has put forward a sweeping
theory of culture.39 From his original academic base in literary criticism,
Girard found that great works of literature repeatedly put forward the
proposition that human desire is grounded neither in the characteristics of
the person nor the object desired but rather in mimesis, i.e., the need to
imitate others.' People will seek to obtain an object or pursue a way of
life because someone else does the same.4'
Imitation is, of course, absolutely necessary for the growth of the individual from infancy to maturity, and on a broader scale, for the transmission of culture from one generation to the next. And in both literature and
life, the impulse to imitate can lead to comic results. 42 But, perhaps more
often, it will lead to tragedy, as rivals compete for the same goals. Desire
for the same goals leads to desire to be like one's rival, and this leads to
conflict as each rival redoubles his effort to supplant the other. Without
intervention by social institutions, this cycle of imitative rivalry, or mimesis, will escalate to violence. 43
Girard found this tendency toward mimesis in both fiction and the social sciences, particularly anthropology. 4' The function of law, Girard contends, is to limit imitation so that it does not spiral out of control and
threaten the community.' But legal and cultural institutions, operating as
they normally do, will sometimes fail to effectively restrain escalating violence. As more individuals see themselves as rivals for the same objects,
39. For the most thorough available presentations of Girard's thoughts, see RENE GIRARD, ViOLENCE AND THE SACRED (Patrick Gregory trans., 1977) [hereinafter GIRARD, VIOLENCE], and RENE

GIRARD, THINGS HIDDEN SINCE THE FOUNDATION OF THE WORLD (Stephen Bann & Michael Mettecr
trans., 1987) [hereinafter GIRARD, THINGS HIDDEN]. For a good single volume explaining and exploring the implications of Girard's thought, see GIL BAILIE, VIOLENCE UNVEILED: HUMANITY AT THE
CROSSROADS (1999).
40.

See GIRARD, VIOLENCE, supra note 39, at 146; GIRARD, THINGS HIDDEN, supra note 39, at

283-98.
41. GIRARD, VIOLENCE, supra note 39, at 145.
42. The classic literary example is Cervantes's Don Quixote. GIRARD, THINGS HIDDEN, .supra note
39,at 15-16.
43. The pattern of mimesis leading to conflict and tragedy can be found in Greek tragedy. GIRARD,
VIOLENCE, supra note 39, at 46-48, in early Bible stories, BAILIE, supranote 39, at 137-40, in Shakespeare, GIRARD, THINGS HIDDEN, supra note 39 at 36, and in Dostoevsky, id. at 33847.
44. GIRARD, THINGS HIDDEN, supranote 39, at 3-138.
45. Id. at 10-19.
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violence erupts, and each act of violence in turn attracts its own imitators."
Some dramatic step must be taken to stop the spiral of violence and reunite
the community; since violence must return violence, this step must itself be
violent.47 The community must identify a common enemy, who can be
seen to be the source of the community's discord. The community will
turn its concerted violence against that enemy, and since that person has no
supporters in the community, there will be no further violent response. The
crisis brought about by mimetic violence will be averted, at least until a
new cycle of violence arises.
This process produces at least one striking paradox. The victim who
was declared to be the source of the community's discord has now, by virtue of the violence directed against him, become the source of the community's newfound peace. The victim has become, in some strange way, sacred as the bestower of good and evil.49 Girard sees this scapegoating process as the point of origin of religion.
In its many forms, religion, according to Girard, will attempt to maintain community cohesion through controlled reenactment of the murder of
the community's chosen victim. This could take place either through an
actual killing, or by a symbolic reenactment of the original act."0 In either
case, the reenactment will be strictly regulated. It must be performed only
by those authorized, and in the manner prescribed, by the community. To
attempt the act outside of these parameters will not only be ineffective, it
will be sacrilegious."
Girard examined the practices of primitive societies, and concluded
that the victim chosen by the community need not actually be guilty of
anything in order for the process to be effective. When a murder threatened community stability in primitive societies, community leaders would
consciously avoid selecting the actual murderer as the sacrificial victim.
While this seems perverse to modem eyes, it is actually entirely consistent
with the goal of the process, which is to bring peace to the community.
46. GIRARD, VIOLENCE, supra note 39, at 18-27.

47. "Only violence can put an end to violence, and that is why violence is self-propagating. Everyone wants to strike the last blow, and reprisal can thus follow reprisal without any true conclusion ever
being reached." L at 26.
48. "Where only shortly before a thousand individual conflicts had raged unchecked between a
thousand enemy brothers, there now reappears a true community, united in its hatred for one alone of
its number. All the rancors scattered at random among the divergent individuals, all the differing
antagonisms, now converge on an isolated and unique figure, the surrogatevclm." Id. at 79.
49. "[IThe surrogate victim--or, more simply, the final victim-inevitably appears as a being who
submits to violence without provoking a reprisal; a supernatural being who sows violence to reap
peace; a mysterious savior who visits affliction on mankind in order subsequently to restore it to good
health." Id. at 86.
50. Thus, animal sacrifices may be substituted for human sacrifice "to reproduce the mechanism of
violent unanimity." Id. at 97.
51. Societies will often outlaw imitative behavior outside of the context of the carefully controlled
community ritual. GIRARD, THINGS HIDDEN, supranote 39,at 10-23.
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The true killer will most likely have friends and relatives in the community, who would retaliate to avenge his execution. Only one who can be
seen as the enemy of the entire community can unify the community
against him. 2 The sacrificial victim, then, is both the enemy and the benefactor of the community. Thus, he is best seen as both part of, and outside
of the community. 3 Primitive tribes would often choose a stranger to fill
this role, but only after the victim had been partially integrated into the
community. Examples might include slaves.' Similarly, when tribes later
sacrificed animals, instead of humans, they used domestic animals because,
while different from people, they were still members of the community. 5
The community's victim must be seen as guilty by the community,
even if he has been chosen arbitrarily. Primitive societies developed rituals
which encouraged, or even required, the sacrificial victim to violate social
taboos or to claim and receive great privileges prior to the sacrifice. 6 This
would give the community a reason to kill, because now the victim's behavior would mark him as a transgressor, or one who wrongfully claimed
special status, yet, paradoxically, to the extent that the community acceded
to his earlier claims of privilege, would also mark the victim as someone
special.
Of course, Girard recognizes that the way that society "avoid[s] being
caught up in an interminable round of revenge"'57 must evolve. Primitive
rituals will not suffice to unify the modem community; the community will
no longer accept that those rituals identify those responsible for community
dis'cord. The creation of an effective modem judicial system, then, is the
highest level of human development in the effort to constrain social violence. In a post-Enlightenment world, only a convincing demonstration
of actual guilt will satisfy the community's demand for justice in the identification of its enemies. This emphasis on rational demonstration of guilt
will, to most people, sharply distinguish modem legal systems from earlier
societies that employed ritual or such methods as trial by combat.59 But
despite the obvious differences, Girard emphasizes that ultimately each of
these systems serves the same goal.' Modem legal systems, no less than
52. See GIRARD, VIOLENCE, supra note 39, at 21-22.
53. "[A]II victims, even the animal ones, bear a certain resemblance to the object they replace;

otherwise the violent impulse would remain unsatisfied. But this resemblance must not be carried to
the extreme of complete assimilation, or it would lead to disastrous confusion." Id. at II.
54. Id. at271.

55. See id. at 272-73.
56. Id. at 104-07. A prisoner might be encouraged to violate the law, or coerced into a ritualistic
escape attempt. Id. at 274-75. A society might choose to execute its kings, and as part of the ritual
require that the king ritually engage in forbidden acts of violence or incest. Id. at 104-10.

57. Id. at 20.
58. Id. at 22.
59. "It has long been assumed that a decisive difference between primitive and civilized man is the
former's general inability to identify the guilty party and to adhere to the principle of guilt." Id. at 22,

60. Id.
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their predecessors, seek to break the cycle of imitative violence by direct-

ing the community's mimetic violent urge toward the punishment of a
common enemy.

A modem American observer might be quick to dismiss the notion that
the victimage process identified by Girard in early societies could carry

significant weight in explaining the contemporary administration of the
death penalty. But Girard's theories, perhaps surprisingly, provide clear

explanations for a number of aspects of capital punishment that seem either
unrelated to, or even in conflict with, the accepted jurisprudential goals of

deterrence or retribution. Some of these aspects may be rather trivial. For
example, how might we explain the persistent public fascination with the
ritual of the condemned prisoner's last meal?6 On the eve of execution,

we see the legal system granting the prisoner a special privilege; is this a
vestige of the primitive practice of exalting the victim and extending him

kingly privileges before the ritual sacrifice?
The framework provided by Girard's theories would explain much

more significant things as well. As we have seen, both deterrence and retribution would demand that the death penalty be imposed only upon the

most calculating and evil killers. Executing the young or the mentally retarded' serves neither of these goals particularly well. But if the true pur-

pose behind the execution is to unite the community against a common
enemy, the choice of a victim who is in some way significantly different
than most of us will actually further this goal, by making us less likely to
empathize or identify with the "monster."'s Might this also explain, even
better than any degree of conscious racism, the over-representation of mi-

nority groups on death row?
When a prisoner on death row falls ill or attempts suicide, the state will
exert itself to restore him to health, so that he may later be put to death.'
Does this make any sense in the context of deterrence or retribution theo61. The Texas Department of Criminal Justice actually maintains a Website otlast meal requests by
executed prisoners. TEXAS DEP'T OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, FINAL MEAL REQUESTS, at http://dj.state.tx.
uslstat/finalmeals.htm (last updated Feb. 9, 2000). An entire book has been devoted to last meal requests and last words. RICHARD K. NONGARD, FINAL WORDS: PARTING THOUGHTS AND LAST MEALS
FROM DEATH Row (1997). Newspapers often describe last meals. E.g., Richard C. Paddock, Triple
KillerPrepares to Die As Appeal Rejected; Execution: Lasyers Say He Should Be Spared Because of
Mental Illness. He Has Been on Death Row 17 Years, LA. TIMES, May 3, 1996. at I, LEXIS, News
Library, Lat File (reporting on a last meal of "fried pork chops, baked potato, asparagus, salAd with
bleu cheese dressing, French bread with butter, apple pie with ice cream and a glass o whole milk");
James Varney, Time Runs Out for Killer; Antonio James Is Put To Death, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Mar. I,
1996 at Al, LEXIS, News Library, Notpic File (reporting on a last meal of "fried oysters, fried shrimp,
fried catfish, crawfish etoufee, seafood gumbo, hush puppies, French fries. pecan pie and Coca-Cola").
62. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
63. See GIRARD, VIOLENCE, supra note 39, at 271.
64. Failure to do so might well be seen as a violation of the prisoner's right to medical treatmenL
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). Prison authorities have a duty to avoid "deliberate indifference" to prison suicides. Tittle v. Jefferson County Comm'n, 10 F.3d 1535, 1539 (1 th Cir. 1994).
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ries? But Girard notes that for a ritual sacrifice to be effective, it must be
carried out according to accepted rubrics; merely seeing to it that the prisoner is no longer alive will not suffice.65
To the extent that the death penalty is successful in fulfilling deterrent
or retributive goals, the community's reaction to the murderer following
his execution should be one of unambiguous revulsion. Yet, at least some
of the more prominent murderers of recent years have been the subject of
fascination, inspiring works of biography and even fiction." Is this fascination with the executed criminal a modem version of the elevation of the
sacrificial victim to a sacred status?67
The ability of Girard's theories to explain a number of puzzling aspects
of the modem American death penalty is striking. What are the consequences of recognizing the importance of the symbolic, ritualistic elements
of the death penalty? If the primary function of the death penalty is neither
deterrence nor retribution, but rather to provide a ritual to unite the community by causing them to direct their hatred toward a particular individual, how will this affect the debate on abolition or suspension of capital
punishment? How does a legal system committed to rational deliberation
deal with the appearance of powerful and seemingly non-rational matters?
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MORATORIUM MOVEMENT AND
ABOLITIONISTS

To recognize that the symbolic, ritualistic aspects of the death penalty,
far from being merely amusing peripheral things, are actually central to an
understanding of the needs addressed by capital punishment is not to entirely ignore matters of utility or retribution. A retributivist may obviously
also expect, or at least hope, that punishment will also have some deterrent
effect. Likewise, punishment rituals primarily aimed at uniting the community in its hatred of a common enemy will also impact concerns that are
more readily accepted as central to criminal justice.
It seems clear that Girard's theory regards the scapegoating process as
essentially pursuing consequentialist ends. The purpose sought is community peace, a reduction in the need for members of the community to engage in mimetic violence. In this regard, the execution of the scapegoat
can be seen as acting to promote deterrence, but in a very different way
than the commonly accepted notion that a rational, welfare-maximizing
65. When Nazi leader Hermann Goering was able to commit suicide on the eve of his scheduled
execution, he was seen as, in some sense, managing to frustrate the judicial process that had sentenced
him to death. JOSEPH E. PERsiCO, NUREMBERG, INFAMY ON TRIAL 421-25, app. at 445-47 (1994).
66. See, e.g., NORMAN MAILER, THE EXECutONER'S SONG (1993) (discussing Gary Gilmore);
ANN RULE, THE STRANGER BESIDE ME (20th anniv. ed. 1999) (discussing Ted Bundy); TERRY SULLIVAN & PETER T. MAIKEN, KILLER CLOWN (1999) (discussing John Wayne Gacy).
67. See GIRARD, VIOLENCE, supra note 39, at 275.
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potential killer will decide not to kill because of the cost involved. Instead,
capital punishment will act in a more subtle way to promote a sense of
community and reduce people's need to act in violent ways as individuals.
Whether such an effect actually exists, of course, would seem extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to establish.6 And the scapegoating process is
even more firmly linked to concepts of retribution. While the scapegoat
need not be actually guilty in order for the process to be effective, it is essential that he be perceived as guilty.' If the community sees the execution as unjust, it cannot succeed in uniting the community. In a primitive
society, a ritualistic selection process might suffice; in the Middle Ages,
trial by combat or by fire could be seen to reveal guilt. Today, few in
America would accept the results of such a system. The mechanism that
decides who will be executed must conform to modem standards of fairness sufficient to satisfy the public that the condemned, at the very least,
committed the act for which he has been condemned,70 and perhaps also, is
sufficiently blameworthy to deserve capital punishment.7 '
Here, at the point where retribution and the need for a scapegoat to
unite the community converge, we can begin to comment specifically on
the current proposals for a moratorium on the imposition of capital punishment. The existence of DNA evidence, with its essentially unprecedented power to provide nearly certain proof of innocence, may well constitute a two-edged sword for abolitionists. While some consequentialists
might accept the occasional execution of one who is "actually innocent" as
a necessary price to achieve social benefits, surely no one would endorse
the execution of one who has clearly established innocence. Thus, it is
difficult to imagine how even an ardent death penalty supporter would object to postponing executions until all available scientific tests were performed in search of definitive proof of innocence.
But if DNA can provide overwhelming evidence of innocence, it can
likewise provide overwhelming evidence of guilt. And there will no doubt
be many capital cases where there simply is no such evidence, either exculpatory or incriminating, at all. Supporters of capital punishment might
well be advised to enthusiastically endorse widespread DNA testing as a
prerequisite to the imposition of a death sentence. In return for freeing a
68. One study concludes that capital punishment, when executions are widely publicized, leads to a
decrease in the incidence of non-capital crimes. William C. Bailey & Ruth D. Peterson. CapitalPunishment and Non-Capital Crimes: A Test of Deterrence.General Preention,and System-Overload
Arguments, 54 ALB. L. REV. 681, 699 (1990). Classical deterrence theoy would find this puzzling;

how can severely punishing one type of act lead to a decrease in the incidence of an entirely different
kind of act? Yet, if executions serve the purpose of reducing the overall need for the community to act
in aggressive ways, as Girard maintains, the findings may well make sense.
69. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.

70. This consideration is essential in a retributive system, but not necessarily so in a system based
solely upon deterrence. See supranotes 13-14 and accompanying text
71. See supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
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relatively small number of the actually innocent, death penalty advocates
will be able to reinforce public confidence in the overall reliability of the
system.
The immediate, and telling, abolitionist response will be that since it
seems clear that mistakes are made in the imposition of the death penalty in
the absence of DNA evidence, we can assume that at least some of those
sentenced to death where no such evidence is available will also be actually
innocent. While this seems true, it also seems unlikely to change that
many minds. First, we must keep in mind that DNA testing will, in some
cases, prove telling evidence of guilt. At most, the abolitionist argument
founded on the possibility of actual innocence eliminates capital punishment when scientific evidence is inconclusive. This will reduce the number of executions (or perhaps merely change the identities of those condemned); it will not end them.
Second, with respect to cases where scientific evidence is inconclusive,
there may be an unanticipated side effect from the use of DNA to exonerate a small number of defendants. In the fictional courtroom world of
Perry Mason, defense counsel would provide clear evidence not only of
innocence, but of who actually committed the crime. Perry never won a
case merely by establishing reasonable doubt. It is likely that this extremely popular television series subtly led people to believe that defense
lawyers bore the burden of proving innocence, and in fact, were frequently
able to succeed. Will real life stories of defense counsel using DNA evidence to prove innocence lead the public to presume guilt in any case
where such evidence is unavailable?
To a retributionist, convincing evidence of guilt will be essential to
justify punishment. But, as we have seen, the scapegoating process is essentially consequentialist. The absence of evidence of innocence will serve
just as well as the presence of definitive evidence of guilt in uniting the
community. We might note the frequent demands, not only by the public,
but by courts, that the execution process be speeded up. Appeals are to be
limited,72 and even exculpatory evidence must be ignored if deadlines are
missed or other procedural technicalities unobserved.73 While these opinions are defended on the rational grounds that condemned prisoners are
"abusing the system" by raising meritless argument after meritless argument, this seems to be an example of the need to execute one seen to be
guilty (whether he is or not) trumping the powerful demands of a sophisticated retributionism that only the guilty be punished.74 In light of this, it
72. See generallyJoseph L. Hoffman & William J.Stuntz, HabeasAfter the Revolution, 1993 SUp.
Cr. REV. 65; William S. Geimer, Deathat Any Cost:A Critique of the Supreme Court's Recent Retreat
from Its Death Penalty Standards, 12 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 737 (1985).
73. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
74. There are, of course, utilitarians who, while they would not defend intentionally executing the
innocent, are relatively untroubled by the occasional execution, by mistake, of the innocent, concluding
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seems likely that the reaction to the availability of DNA and other strong
scientific evidence of innocence in some cases will not lead death penalty
supporters to question the overall legitimacy of the practice, but at best, to
agree to limited procedural reform to assure that the demonstrably innocent
are not executed, and at worst, to an even stronger conviction in both the
guilt of those who cannot produce such evidence, and the correctness of
subjecting them to the ultimate penalty.
Of course, none of this should lead to the conclusion that all available
steps, including the use of DNA testing, should not be used in an effort to
assure that those who are actually innocent are not executed. But the simple fact that this proposition can be readily endorsed by those with a full
range of views on the general acceptability of capital punishment is a clear
sign that, at most, a moratorium based on doubts about actual innocence
will lead only to somewhat more care in the selection of those sentenced to
death, rather than stronger sentiment against the death penalty itself.
The next step in any abolition movement will be much more contentious. If we can assure that the actually innocent are not executed, or even
go further and assure that capital punishment is imposed only on those
whose guilt is supported by DNA evidence or its scientific equivalent, have
we fully satisfied the demand of a sophisticated retributionist theory that
the punishment be imposed only upon those who deserve it? And have we
fully satisfied the requirement of an effective community ritual that the
community will be united in its opposition to the demonstrably guilty convict?
For the retributionist, the answer should depend on the degree to which
the commission of the act of killing is seen as a fully responsible act. Even
the common law would find, in extreme cases, that mental state or infancy
would make a killer simply not responsible, either fully or partially, for his
act.75 Public opinion, and even expert opinion, has waxed and waned over
the years with respect to the degree to which people could justly be held to
act pursuant to a sufficient degree of free will to justify full responsibility
for their acts. 6 Currently the pendulum seems to have swung toward
maximizing individual responsibility. This can be seen in public and legislative attitudes toward juvenile crime," and excuses such as the insanity
defense.7' But, especially in the context of capital punishment, serious
controversy remains. The Supreme Court has made clear that the decision
to impose the death penalty must be made not on the basis of the killer's
acts alone, but only after consideration of aggravating and mitigating facthat the social benefit of the death penalty outweighs the loss ot innocent lives. Van den Hang. supra
note 13, at 967.
75. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text
76. Seesupranote3l.
77. See supranote 32 and accompanying text.
78. See supranote 31.
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tors.79 Mitigating factors will often include claims that, for one reason or
another, the defendant simply did not have full capacity to control himself.
And while these arguments may be effective in individual cases, the Court
has been extremely reluctant to hold that, as a general rule, youth"0 or even
seriously deficient mental capacity"' will require the state to forego the
death penalty. And evidence that racial factors play a role in the selection
of those sentenced to die has not led the Court to question the fundamental
legitimacy of capital punishment. 2
If retentionists are truly acting from retributivist motives, arguments
that point to the fact that the death penalty system does not single out the
most fully culpable for capital punishment with any degree of reliability
should weigh heavily. And while it is a more profound assault on capital
punishment than one based on assuring that only the actually innocent are
executed, it does pose problems of its own.
To a retributionist, the fact that teenagers, those with limited mental
capacity, or a disproportionate number of members of minority races are
sentenced to death should be troubling. But if retentionists are actually
acting in a way consistent with Girard's theories of the scapegoating process, not only will these facts not shake support for capital punishment, they
will actually strengthen it. As we have seen, Girard maintains that the victim most likely to unify the community in opposition is one who is in some
way noticeably different, although also a member of the community.83 The
same facts that make a killer less likely to serve retributionist, not to mention deterrent, goals by his execution make him more likely to unite the
community in its hatred of him. Thus, to the extent that the need to replicate the scapegoating process, rather than retribution, is at the core of support for the death penalty, abolitionist arguments based on the fact that we
do not choose only the most calculating, rational killers for death will be
ineffective.
But the argument for suspension or abolition of the death penalty based
upon the present system's inability to select those, and only those, most
fully deserving of death contains another serious limitation. Just as the
argument based on actual innocence may highlight the fact that most of
those sentenced to die did commit the crime for which they were convicted, so the argument based upon degree of blameworthiness highlights
79. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 192-98 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., plurality
opinion).
80. Thomson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 815, 838 (1988).
81. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,338-39(1989).
82. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). In McCleskey, the Supreme Court rejected an
attack on the death penalty based upon statistics that indicated not only that black defendants were
more likely than white defendants to be sentenced to death, but also that the race of the victim was
significant. A black defendant convicted of killing a white victim is more likely to receive a death

sentence than any other combination of races of killer and victim. Id. at 321 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
83. GIRARD, VIOLENCE, supra note 39, at 271-73.

HeinOnline -- 33 Conn. L. Rev. 782 2000-2001

THEDEATH PENALTYAS COMMUNITY RITUAL
2001]
the fact that some killers are more fully responsible than others, a fact that
is, of course, also starkly illustrated by the principle that many killers are
not eligible for the death penalty, even in the most death penalty prone
states.8
Several years ago, I was the moderator of a panel discussion on the
death penalty that included both retentionists and abolitionists.s One of
the retentionists mentioned the case of Adolf Eichmann, the high-ranking
Nazi official convicted of genocide and executed by the State of Israel in
the early 1960s. 6 The abolitionist response was to brush the example aside
as irrelevant. On reflection, it occurred to me that the Eichmann example
is very relevant to any death penalty debate, but that it poses serious
difficulties not merely for abolitionists, but for retentionists as well.
The double-edged nature of the Eichmann example lies in the fact that
the state of Israel has executed Adolf Eichmann and no one else in its more
than fifty year history. Abolitionists must contend with the fact that even
in a community that rejects capital punishment as a general proposition, a
case can and did occur where the criminal's harm was so great, and his
level of personal responsibility so significant that the community demanded the ultimate punishment." But retentionists must contend with the
fact that this community has never found another case rising to the level of
the one that justified capital punishment.
The differences between Eichmann and those executed today in the
United States seem infinitely greater than the differences between those we
execute and those we "merely" imprison for life. Perhaps one need not
closely resemble Eichmann in order to truly deserve death, but unless one
takes the position that all murderers should be executed, it is hard to see
treating a randomly chosen killer and an architect of genocide in the same
way as satisfying any rational sense of justice. But at the same time, to
take a position favoring total abolition of capital punishment would seem
to deny the existence, however rare, of exceptional cases of extreme, unmitigated evil. Of course, one might take the position that while such cases
exist, it is simply beyond our power to identify them; we cannot fully com-

84. Early common law subjected anyone who wrongfully caused the death of another to the death

penalty, but beginning in the thirteenth century, killings were divided into murder and manslaughter.
See Francis B. Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARv. L REV. 974,974-82 (1932). Modem statues further divide
murder into two or more degrees, usually reserving the death penalty for those convicted of first degree
murder. Austin v. United States, 382 F.2d 129, 133-34 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
85. The presentations of the panelists are set forth in Symposium, Reflections on a Quarter-Century
of ConstitutionalRegulation of CapitalPunishment,30 J. MARSHALL L REV. 399 (1997).
86. See generally HANNAH ARENDT, EICHNANN INJERUSALEM (1965).

87. Even in the case of Eichmann, there was some opposition to the death penalty although it
tended to be voiced after, rather than before, it was carried out. ld. at 250-52.

88. The Supreme Court has found, however, that a broad mandatory death penalty would be unconstitutional. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ..
plurality opinion).
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prehend the circumstances that may have led to the commission of an outrageous act. 9 And yet, almost all of us do recognize the case where the

harm caused is exceptional, and the reasons for mitigating punishment
seem entirely absent.

If we focus on retributionist concepts, then, each side of the capital
punishment debate encounters serious difficulties. The process by which
individual killers are selected for death seems to make indefensible distinctions. Still some cases do stand out as calling for the ultimate penalty. The

retentionist has trouble defending the actual application of capital punishment; the abolitionist has trouble arguing that death is never deserved.

This should draw us back to the conclusion that what is going on here,
on both sides of the capital punishment debate, is something other than a
conscious, rational contest over the philosophical bases for retribution. But
how can the issue of capital punishment be addressed if support for the
practice rests largely on grounds that are nonrational yet important to the

community? If we examine Girard's work looking for clear guidance, we
will not necessarily find satisfactory answers.

Girard explicitly states that he has no interest in pursuing reform
though political action.' Instead, viewing the historical landscape through
the lenses of a radical Christianity,9 he contends that abandonment of the
scapegoating mechanism will occur only through the complete renuncia-

tion of the use of mimetic, retaliatory violence, even in pursuit of just
ends.92 Girard's theology sees this as the ultimate goal toward which humanity is heading. In his view, the execution of Jesus was the historical

event that planted, however tenuously, the sense of the horrible consequences of the use of violence to unify the community against a "criminal."'93 In the intervening two thousand years, this sense of revulsion
against the community's use of violence has grown, and it will inevitably
89. Full comprehension of the causes of antisocial acts will not necessarily mean that the legal

system is not still justified in exacting punishment. "[T]here is a difference between explaining a
person's wrongful behavior and explaining it away... Otherwise, there would be no basis for moral
responsibility .... Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CAL. L. REv. 257,284 (1987).
90. "What is interesting in our work here is not the possibility of making impressionistic applications of the theory in order to denounce any aspect of society we please." GIRARD, THINGS HIDDEN,
supra note 39, at 34.
91. The conventional Christian view of the crucifixion of Jesus is that it was a sacrificial act, demanded by God the Father, to atone for mankind's sin. Thus, since the act was demanded by and
pleasing to God, the conventional view can be seen as endorsing the retributive process. Girard, in
contrast, sees the execution of Jesus as a clear injustice. The slow realization by mankind of the injustice of the act will eventually lead to the rejection of retaliatory violence, even where it seems in human
terms, to be fully justified. See id. at 180-223.
92. "Jesus explains to us mankind's true vocation, which is to throw off the hold of the founding
murder." Id. at 216.
93. "The Cross derives its dissolving capacity from the fact that it makes plain the workings of
what can now only be seen-after the Crucifixion-as evil .... Under the influence of the spirit, the
disciples perpetuated the memory of the event... in a form that reveals the innocence of the just man
who has suffered martyrdom." Id. at 193-94.
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become so robust that public confidence in the scapegoating mechanism
will be completely undermined.'
Yet even Girard maintains that undermining public acceptance of the
use of community violence to counter violence carries with it significant
dangers. If ritual violence is to be used to unify the community, then abandoning an effective method of satisfying the mimetic urge may lead to
greater intra-community violence.9" As actors in the political and legal
system, we can hardly avoid taking some position; we do not have the luxury of sitting on the sidelines and waiting for inevitable historical forces to
take effect. But can we ignore the possibility that in undermining public
confidence in the death penalty, we may deprive the community of a unifying tool that serves an important purpose? If the community cannot enact a
ritual of violence against criminals, will it engage in even more destructive
violence against those, within or outside the community, seen as the other?
The most direct response to the claim that communities need capital
punishment is, of course, to point to the large number of communities that
have renounced it. This includes not only other nations, but a number of
American states. If western European nations and states such as Vermont
and Minnesota do not need the death penalty, why do states such as California and Texas feel that need? And why does a state such as New York,
having gone without the death penalty for decades, feel the need to reestablish it?
If the ultimate value of capital punishment is its symbolic power, then
perhaps the most important task for abolitionists will be to put forward
alternative symbolic routes to the same goal, that of achieving community
unity. Girard points out that within religious communities, human sacrifice
gave way to animal sacrifice, which has largely given way to purely symbolic rituals of sacrifice." These non-lethal rituals retain much of the
power of the earlier, destructive practices. It would seem likely that within
the secular religion of the law, the same process might apply.
This suggests that if the death penalty is to be abolished, it must be
replaced with an alternative community ritual. If this substitution is not
effective, then efforts to undermine public confidence in the death penalty
may be counterproductive. As more members of the community lose faith
in capital punishment, the ritual of the death penalty becomes less able to
fulfill its goal of uniting the community. But rather than reacting by abandoning capital punishment, its supporters are likely to insist that it is failing
94. See id.at 196-202.
95. "[V]iolence, having lost its vitality and bite, will
paradoxically be more terrible than before its

decline. As the whole of humanity makes the vain effort to reinstate its reconciliatory and sacrificial
virtues, this violence will without doubt tend to multiply its victims...." Id. at 196.
96. "In order to reproduce a model of the mimetic crisis in a spirit of social harmony, the enactment
must be progressively emptied of all real violence so that only the 'pure' form is allowed to survive."
Id. at 21.
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because it simply isn't being invoked forcefully or frequently enough.
When ritual fails, a common response is to repeat it, more fervently and
frequently, hoping that eventually it will be effective. 7 We may be witnessing this phenomenon already. It is easy to conclude that the recent
increase in the number of executions has led to an increase in the calls for
abolition of capital punishment, but is it possible that, in turn, the increased
calls for abolition, which refute the notion that the death penalty unites us,
leads supporters to insist on progressively speedier executions?
It would be nice to think that the community rituals that might replace
capital punishment would be uplifting affirmations of the values of a universal community. But Girard's analysis suggests that while that might be
possible at some distant "omega point"9' 8 in the future, present day human
communities still require rituals that unite them in some form of opposition
to the other, to that which is foreign and threatening. European nations that
have abolished the death penalty are relatively homogenous in language,
culture and ethnicity; perhaps this provides them with a sufficient sense of
unity and distinctiveness against the "other" so that they have less of a
need to find
a common enemy within, at least one who must be dealt with
violently."9
But perhaps the relative homogeneity of European nations is, at best,
only a partial explanation. For while these countries no longer execute
criminals, and also have lower overall rates of incarceration than the
United States, this hardly means that they do not unite in their expressions
of revulsion against those who commit violent crime. It is often overlooked, for example, that as harsh as American prison conditions may be,
observers rate prison conditions in some abolitionist countries as far
worse."eo Incarceration is, of course, the use of state coercion and, while
short of execution or torture, a violent act against the criminal. The experience of other nations, and some American states, indicates that community
denunciation of a criminal followed by lengthy, harsh treatment can fulfill
the symbolic goals sought by the death penalty as well as actual executions, at least in most cases.
97. "[D]emystification of the system necessarily coincides with the disintegration of that system...
. In fact, demystification leads to constantly increasing violence .. " GIRARD, VIOLENCE, supra noto
39, at 24.
98. The term is not Girard's but that used by theologian-paleontologist Pierre Teilhard do Chardin,
to signify the ultimate point of evolution. URSULA KING, SPIRIT OF FIRE: THE LIFE AND VISION OF
TEILHARD DE CHARDIN 176 (1996).
99. Of course, at some point a strong sense of community and solidarity can be dangerous, leading
to xenophobia, or exclusion or belittling of anyone who appears to be outside of the community consensus. For a discussion of the issue of cultural minorities, and the principle of nationality, see DAVID
MILLER, ON NATIONALITY 119-54 (1995).
100. Human Rights Watch maintains a summary of prison conditions. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
ENDING THE ABUSIVE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH PRISON PROJECT, at
http://www.igc.org/hrw/advocacy/prisons (last visited Jan. 19, 2001).
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Any campaign to abolish the death penalty, it would seem, will be effective only if it can satisfy the community's need to denounce the criminal, and treat him harshly, while stopping short of killing him. And this
will, no doubt, be troubling to at least some abolitionists. Many who oppose the death penalty simultaneously work for a less harsh criminal justice
system in general, one focusing on rehabilitation and eschewing any punishment beyond the minimum necessary to achieve that goal, and possibly
the goal of deterrence. But to the extent that the abolitionist movement is
seen as simply a part of an overall movement to be less punitive, more understanding and sympathetic to, violent criminals, it is likely to meet fierce
resistance.
Public opinion polling has shown that public support for the death penalty drops significantly when the question is phrased to highlight the alternative of a life sentence without chance of parole."' In very rational terms,
this option assumes with reasonable certainty that the killer will not kill
again. But perhaps more significantly, it emphasizes the fact that the
community, through the judicial system, has not minimized the crime, or
the community's revulsion. We have denounced the murderer, and will be
subjecting him to harsh treatment. For many, this is sufficient to satisfy the
needs addressed by the scapegoating process.
Abolitionists, especially those grounded in strong religious beliefs, will
often shape their arguments around concepts of forgiveness of, and empathy with, the condemned killer.'02 To those of us who share those beliefs,
these arguments can seem powerful. But such an approach may be counterproductive. In at least some cases, the community will be unable to forgive or empathize. It will demand an unambiguous communal denunciation of the criminal, followed by unambiguously punitive actions against
him. To ignore this will be to undermine any movement against capital
punishment
Perhaps an effort to simultaneously undermine public confidence in the
death penalty and emphasize alternative ways of expressing communal
outrage might succeed in satisfying the urges that support capital punishment. But perhaps a different approach might prove fruitful as well. Recently, the New Hampshire legislature voted to abolish that state's death
penalty, but the repeal measure was vetoed by Governor Shaheen."' No
one has been executed in New Hampshire in decades; °4 New Hampshire

101. Seesupra note 10.
102. Certainly the most prominent recent example is Dead Man Walkng. HELEN PREJEAN, DEAD
MAN WALKING (1993).

103. See Norma Love, Death Penalty Stays in New Hampshire, AP ONLINE. June 27. 2000. 2000
VL 23360324.
104. The last execution in New Hampshire was in 1939. Ma
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crime.' °5

has a low incidence of violent
Why, then, would a governor feel
the need to veto the repeal measure?
It is too easy to simply reject this as political grandstanding. The legislators who voted for repeal, after all, were just as likely as the governor to
have an accurate sense of general public sentiment. Perhaps Governor
Shaheen's veto illustrates as well as any recent political development the
symbolic power of the death penalty. Might the mere existence of the
death penalty serve a significant purpose, even if it is never invoked? Believers in classical theories of deterrence would quickly answer affirmatively; to them, the death penalty frightens potential murderers, effectively
negating their murderous desires, and avoiding the need to even impose the
sanction. But empirical evidence does not support such an effect. 0 6
The mere existence of capital punishment on the statute books may
serve the symbolic function of asserting the community's belief that there
are cases of unmitigated evil that deserve a violent community response.
This mere assertion may satisfy the demand for at least symbolic, if not
actual, violence. Perhaps Governor Shaheen's veto was as effective as the
imposition of an actual death sentence in fulfilling capital punishment's
ritual goals. Along those same lines, we might note that Illinois Governor
Ryan, in declaring a moratorium on executions, coupled it with a reaffirmation of his belief in the death penalty itself. Might the death penalty,
somewhat like nuclear weapons, have an effect even if never used?
Of course, in the case of nuclear weapons, great efforts are made to see
to it that they never need to be used. Similarly, the moratorium movement
might strive to so severely limit the application of the death penalty that it
becomes essentially extinct, while never denying, and perhaps vigorously
asserting, its theoretical validity, and perhaps its appropriate use in an exceptionally rare case. It is often overlooked that a number of nations that
have essentially abolished the death penalty have done so while reserving
capital punishment for truly exceptional circumstances, such as wartime
treason. 7 The case of Israel's execution of Eichmann again comes to
mind. Thus, even a community generally in favor of abolition hesitates,
when asked whether no crime, even in theory, might justify the death penalty. It will be difficult for a committed abolitionist to substitute "hardly
ever" for "never" when asked when capital punishment is justified. But
perhaps ultimately reaching the point where the United States adopts its
own version of "Adolf Eichmann, but no one else" is the goal that either
the moratorium or abolitionist movement can, or should, strive for.

105. "The state had the nation's lowest murder rate in 1998, has no capital trials pending, and has no
one on death row." Id.
106. See supra note 12.

107. A number of abolitionist nations retain the death penalty for treason or certain wartime offenses. Z1MRING & HAWKINS, supra note 12, at 29 tbl.2.1, 31 tbl.2.3.
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CONCLUSION

Ronald Tabak is surely correct in concluding that capital punishment is
ultimately a political, rather than merely a legal, issue. Its retention or abolition will depend more on public sentiment than on courtroom arguments
about the Eighth Amendment. And for abolitionists, this means that large
numbers of supporters of capital punishment must be convinced to change
their position. This is unlikely to occur unless the motives that animate
death penalty supporters are understood and addressed. It may be emotionally satisfying to attribute support for the death penalty entirely to the
actions of cynical politicians and the attitudes of morally obtuse citizens,
but such a position is unlikely to actually change many minds.
Standard justifications for capital punishment, deterrence and retribution, fall seriously short of explaining many aspects of the death penalty as
currently applied. But Girard's contention that society has a strong need
for powerful rituals of violence to provide a sense of community and solidarity against a common enemy provides an intriguing alternative view of
the key function of capital punishment. It is not entirely unrelated to traditional rationales; it is consequentialist, but not in the rationalist manner of
classical deterrence theory; it will not work in modem society if it violates
the retributionist demands that the victim be actually responsible for the
alleged crime. In light of all this, what can we say about the current moratorium movement?
To the extent that the moratorium movement insists that no execution
go forward in the face of scientific evidence of innocence, it can hardly be
opposed. But DNA and other evidentiary advances are also sure to provide
nearly incontrovertible evidence of guilt as well. To the extent that the
movement emphasizes the possibility of "actual innocence," it risks simultaneously strengthening the resolve of death penalty supporters in the many
cases where there is no doubt of who committed the crime.
If the moratorium movement is to move beyond "actual innocence," it
can expect much tougher going. Many states' continued willingness to
execute minors or those with mental deficiencies is stark evidence of peoples' felt need for rituals that condemn evil; arguments, however powerful,
based on the criminals' lack of full responsibility, arguments that should
weigh heavily in the mind of a sophisticated retributionist, make surprisingly little headway. Perhaps this is due, as Girard would observe, to the
eagerness of the community to select a victim who is identifiably different
in some way from the rest of us. Perhaps it is due to death penalty supporters' suspicion that to absolve one killer of full responsibility will lead
to absolving all.
It is unlikely that we will see a widespread social rejection of all violence, even violence in the pursuit of justice, in the foreseeable future.
Society, sadly, will still need to express revulsion, and do so through legal
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means. If the moratorium movement is to move beyond securing more
reliable procedures to determine who is executed to something approaching
abolition, it will have to take seriously the need of the public to respond as
strongly as possible to the presence of true evil in the community. I am not
at all sure that I have any final answers to the question of how to simultaneously satisfy this need and at least approach the goal of complete abolition of the death penalty. Perhaps the best possible solution will be to
work toward an American solution that resembles that of Israel: capital
punishment for Eichmann, or the extremely rare equivalent, but for no one
else. Perhaps this is where the moratorium movement might lead. We
might retain the symbol of capital punishment, but renounce its actual use.
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